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NOTES
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY IN SING-ALIKE CASES*
INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is a person's right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her indentity. 1 It allows a public figure2 to
juxtapose an element of his persona3 with a product or service and
thereby create an endorsement through the infusion of publicity
value associated with the celebrity's fame.4 The right of publicity
exists solely in the statutess or common law6 of the states.7
The supremacy clause of the Constitution requires that direct con-
flicts between federal law and the laws of the states be resolved in
favor of federal law.' When Congress drafted the 1976 Copyright
* This Note won First Prize in the 1990 Nathan J. Burkham Memorial
Copyright Competition, sponsored by ASCAP, at Fordham University School of
Law.
1. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569, 575
(1977); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the
Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. Rhv. 1703, 1704 (1987).
2. Most right of publicity suits are brought by public figures since only widely
recognized people are endowed with significant commercially exploitable public-
ity value. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
835 (6th Cir. 1983); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn.
1970); Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VANu. L. Rzv. 1199, 1202 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (name and likeness); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J.
1981) (performing style); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis.2d 379, 280
N.W.2d 129 (1979) (nickname); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1988) (voice). Some courts have gone beyond personal characteristics to recog-
nize appropriations of things associated with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Carson, 698
F.2d 831 (phrase associated with plaintiff); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's racing car).
4. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,
336 (1979) (Bird, C.J. dissenting); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names,
Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 Txx. L. Rzv. 637, 644-46 (1973).
5. See Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny: Sounding Off on
Sound-Alikes, 57 FoRD. L. Rzv. 445, 449 & n.44 (1988).
6. See id. at 449-50 & n.45.
7. See id. at 445 n.2.
8. See U.S. CowsT., art. VI ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land.").
However, "the inquiry is whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between
the federal and state regulatory schemes." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659 (1982). Courts should always attempt to reconcile the clash of laws to
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Act (the "Act"), it incorporated federal preemption into section 301
of the Act.9 Under § 301, state law will be preempted when the
state right asserted is equivalent to a right assertable by a federal
copyright owner and the work claimed to be protected by state law
is of the kind that is protected by the Act.10
In 1988, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Midler
v. Ford Motor Co. " that the deliberate imitation of a singer's voice
for commercial purposes violated the singer's right of publicity. 2
Prior to Midler, courts had found that sing-alike claims were pre-
empted by copyright law1 3 because of the inextricability of the vo-
cal simulation claim from the federally protected song containing
the simulation. 14 Concerning preemption, however, defendants
avoid preemption. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117, 127 (1973).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) provides in part:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed exclu-
sively by this title....
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to -
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of au-
thorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or ....
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106.
10. See Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236,
1238 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp.
1523, 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); J. McCarthy, Tiz Riowrs or Pu,.,crry and PIVACy
§ 11.13[A][2], at 11-63 (1990).
11. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
12. See id. at 463-64. In Midler, the defendant asked actress and singer Bette
Midler to re-record the song "Do You Wanna Dance" for musical accompaniment
to its commercial. When she refused, the defendant instructed a Midler soundalike
to mimic her performance of the song, and thereby misled listeners into believing
that they were actually hearing Midler.
13. In a case involving the fixation of a visual performance on videotape for
broadcast on a television news program, the Supreme Court, in its only right of
publicity case to date, held that the performer's right of publicity was not pre-
empted. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
14. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970)
(decided under the 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971);
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (decided under the 1976 Copyright Act); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (1909 Act); see also Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F.
Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (vocal imitation in context of commercial voiceover
under 1909 Act). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962)
(no preemption of claim for vocal imitation in context of commercial voiceover
under 1909 Act).
Federal Preemption in Sing-Alike Cases
should not hasten to abandon the authority of pre-Midler caselaw in
light of the dubious precedential value of the Midler opinion. Be-
sides the obvious stare decisis limitations, the Ninth Circuit barely
gives lip service to § 301 1 despite the existence of prior cases that
had dismissed or questioned similar claims based on federal pre-
emption.16 Specifically, the court's simplistic resolution of the con-
tention that Midler's voice was in fact fixed in a protected musical
work17 was superficial for its failure to reach the merits of the argu-
ment.' 8 Moreover, although a finding that a person's voice is not a
work protected by the Act would be sufficient to preserve the state
created right, 19 the court should have undertaken an equivalency of
rights analysis under § 301 for the benefit of future litigation. 0
Thus, while sing-alike advertising continues to be a profitable way
to create an endorsement,2 ' the ability of plaintiffs to maintain a
right of publicity action based upon the imitation of voice remains
unclear. Defendants continue to argue that any voice publicity
claim that requires reference to a sound recording to link the imita-
tion to the plaintiff necessarily invades the exclusive domain of fed-
eral copyright and cannot exist under state law.22 Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, insist that their reliance upon state law is beyond the
15. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 ("Midler does not seek damages for Ford's use
of 'Do You Want To Dance,' and thus her claim is not preempted by federal copy-
right law. Copyright protects 'original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.' A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed'.").
The court fails to even mention or cite to § 301 in its opinion.
16. See supra, note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See Brief for Appellees at 32, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168).
18. See Note, Commercial Sound-Alikes: An Argument for a Pedormer's Cause
of Action, 62 ST. Joim's L Rzv. 667, 685 n.119 (1988); infra notes 99-103, 121-
124 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text; infra note 93 and accompany-
ing text.
20. See Note, supra note 18, at 685 n.119.
21. See Miller, Gonna Hawk Around the Clock Tonight, Mother Jones, Nov.
1988, at 40-42 (adapted from M. Miller, BoxED I: THz CuLTuRz or TV (1988))
(many advertisers are turning to sound-alike advertising to target the young demo-
graphic); Wall St. J., March 12, 1987, at 35, col. 1 (advertisers clearly pay less to
the imitator than the real thing). Even within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit,
advertisers may be able to imitate the voices of popular singers if they do not do so
"deliberately" or if the singer's voice is not "distinctive", pursuant to Mid)er's nar-
row holding. idler, 849 F.2d at 463.
22. See Brief for Appellees at 32, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168); see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435
F.2d 711,716 (9th Cir. 1970) (Plaintiff claimed that "the sound in connection with
the music, lyrics and arrangement... ought to be protected. But as to these latter
copyrightable items she had no rights."), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971);
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) ("essence of plaintiff's complaint is derived from defendant's alleged
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work").
1990]
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preemptive reach of § 301 since what they are protecting - the in-
tangible persona - is not the subject matter of copyright. 23
This paper will explore the tension between the limited creative
monopoly possessed by copyright owners under the Act 24 and the
apparently greater scope of protection offered to public figures by
way of state rights of publicity.25 Part I discusses in general terms
the legacy of federal supremacy under the 1909 Copyright Act and
its growth into the present scheme of preemption under § 301. Part
II examines the equivalent rights portion of the Act's preemption
test, including the section's legislative history, whether the right of
publicity may limit the use of copyrighted works, and the effect of
§ 114(b). Part III compares the subject matter of copyright to that of
the right of publicity, and includes a discussion of the controversial
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n 26
case. Finally, this paper concludes that federal copyright law does
not preempt state law rights of publicity when such rights are in-
fringed by imitation of a performer's voice within the context of a
copyrighted musical work.
I. THE FEDERAL SCHEME OF PREEMPTION
In 1964, the Supreme Court held in the companion cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.2 7 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Ligh ting, Inc. 28 that "when an article is unprotected by a patent or a
copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article." 29
The broad sweep of the Sears/Compco cases gave Congress exclu-
sive protection of intellectual property.3 ° Perhaps realizing it had
gone too far, the Court in Goldstein v. California3 1 seemingly re-
23. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 ("A voice is not copyrightable."); Brief for Ap-
pellant at 13, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
6168); J. McCarthy, supra note 10, at § 11.13[C][4], at 11-73; infra notes 96-97
and accompanying text.
24. See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair
Competition: The Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. CoimuoHr
Soc'Y oF mxz U.S.A. 301, 305 (1986); Simon, Right of Publicity Reified: Fame as a
Business Asset, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rzv. 699, 722-23 (1985); Note, supra note 18, at
682.
25. See supra, note 3.
26. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
27. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
28. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
29. Id. at 237.
30. See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13[A][1], at 11-61. The impact of
Sears/Compco upon copyright was felt by the plaintiffs in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906
(1971) and Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
but was nevertheless unusual since Sears and Compco involved patents, not
copyrights.
31. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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treated from its position in Sears/Compco stating, without holding,
that only those "categories of writings which Congress has . . .
brought within the scope of the federal [copyright] statute" were in-
eligible for state law protection.3 2 This aspect of Goldstein appears
to have been codified in the language of § 301,s3 which limits pre-
emption to works that "come within the subject matter of copy-
right,'" 3 4 and nicely links preemption under the 1909 and 1976
Copyright Acts.3 5
Section 301 of the Act requires two conditions to be met before a
state law will be preempted. 6 First, the right asserted under state
law must be equivalent to an exclusive right of copyright.3 7 Sec-
ond, the state right must be claimed in subject matter protectable by
federal copyright law.3 8 The first condition relates to the nature of
the right granted by state law while the second addresses the nature
of the work protected. "[I]f the state right can pass through one of
the 'two doors' of § 301, then it is not preempted by" the Act.3 9
The draftsmen proclaimed that the preemption "principle in sec-
tion 301 [was] intended to be stated in the clearest and most une-
quivocal language possible. . . to foreclose any conceivable
misrepresentation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague border-
line areas between State and Federal protection."' 40 Despite Con-
gress' good intentions, the amount of text in judicial opinions4 1 and
scholarly commentary that has been devoted to untying the knots in
§ 301 betray the legislature's efforts.42
II. EQUIVALENT RIGHTS
Section 106 of the Act grants to a copyright owner the exclusive
32. Id. at 570 n.28.
33. See 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nnmem oN CopmoHr § 1.01[B][2], at 1-22.1
(1990).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
35. But note that Goldstein did not make any comment concerning the
equivalent rights condition of preemption under the Act.
36. See Motown, 657 F. Supp. at 1238; Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1523; M. Nim-
mer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 1.01[B], at 1-9 to -10.
37. See supra, note 9.
38. See id.
39. J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 4.14[E][2], at 4-94 (emphasis in original) (Mc-
Carthy analogizes the conditions of § 301 to two doors through only one of which a
state right must pass to escape preemption).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663, 674-79 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); Mayer v.
Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1531-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
42. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra, note 33, § 1.01[B], at 1-9; Note, A
Cause of Action for Simulation of Sound Recordings? Yes: Reflections on the
1976 Copyright Act, 38 Rurozas L. REv. 139, 152-54 (1985).
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rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display his copyrighted
work.' 3 The first part of the Act's preemption test requires a court to
determine whether the challenged state right is equivalent to any of
the foregoing rights of copyright. Unfortunately, the precise con-
tours of equivalency have never been authoritatively defined by
Congress or the Supreme Court.
A. The Missing List
When Congress originally drafted § 301, it attempted to shed
light on the meaning of equivalency by including in the language of
the bill an illustrative list of state law rights that were deemed not
equivalent.4 4 However, the Justice Department objected to a subse-
quently amended version of the bill' because the amendment's list
contained a confusing reference to state law misappropriation.' 6
When the amendment was debated on the floor of the House of Rep-
resentatives, an interchange between three Congressmen, in which
none seemed to understand the comments made by the others,4 7 re-
sulted in the deletion of the entire illustrative list.
48
The foregoing bit of legislative history left courts and commenta-
tors bewildered as to the status of the state rights mentioned in the
illustrative lists. Some believe that the deletion of the illustrative list
did not affect Congress' intent, which was expressed in the original
version of the bill.' 9 Others maintain that no conclusion as to
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
44. The original § 301(b) provided:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the ex-
clusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by sec-
tion 106, including breaches of contrac, breaches of tru4 invasion of
privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off
and false representation.
H.R. RxEP. No. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b)(3) 1966 (emphasis supplied).
45. This version listed "rights against misappropriation not equivalent to any of
such exclusive rights" as an example of a non-equivalent right. S. REP. No. 22, 94th
Cong., 2d Ses. § 301(b)(3) 1966.
46. "The 'misappropriation' theory is vague and uncertain .... [It] is almost cer-
tain to nullify preemption." Letter from Justice Department to House Subcommittee
Chairman Robert Kastenmeier (July 27, 1976), reprinted in M. Nimmer & D. Nim-
mer, supra note 33, § 1.01[B], at 1-20.
47. See 122 CoNo. Rxc. No. 10910 (1976); see also M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
supra note 33, § 1.0l[B], at 1-20.2 to -20.3 ("But the respective interpretations of
the amendment voiced by these two gentlemen was diametrically opposed. Mr.
Railsback assumed that it did not affect state law, while Mr. Kastenmeier assumed
that it did. The maker of the amendment, Mr. Seiberling, expressed both views.").
48. See supra note 9.
49. See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 444
(S.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
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equivalency or preemption may be drawn from the legislative his-
tory because of the opacity of the house debate.5
0
Notwithstanding the merits of both interpretations, the legislative
history cannot be said to illuminate controversy concerning the
equivalency of the right of publicity in a soundalike context.
Although the House of Representatives Committee stated that the
"evolving common law rights of 'privacy' [and] 'publicity'... would
remain unaffected" by § 301,1 Congress probably did not foresee
the unavoidable collision of copyright and the right of publicity
presented by a soundale claim.5 2 Each type of right of publicity
infringement must be separately analyzed under § 301. S 3 There-
fore, preemption analysis of an aural simulation must proceed de
novo.
B. Measuring Equivalency
Congress has stated that common law rights broader in scope than
a federal right may be equivalent.54 Similarly, those that merely
complement a federal right may also be equivalent.5 5 But this does
Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Ippolito v. Ono-Len-
non, 139 Misc. 2d 230, 526 N.Y.S.2d 877, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1988), modified, 150
A.D.2d 300 (lot Dep't 1989); Shipley, Publicity Never Dies, It Just Fades Away:
The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CoRwsu L Rzv. 673, 705-06
(1981); Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compul-
sory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. Rv. 1107, 1118
(1978).
50. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663, 676-77 n.25 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987);
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13[A][2], at 11-65.
51. H.R. isp. No.1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) (even this statement is
not unequivocal as the Committee goes on to say that publicity rights are not pre-
empted "so long as [they] contain elements ... different in kind from copyright").
52. Congress was probably thinking of the right of publiciy in its traditional
sense as an appropriation of a person's name or visual likeness since the prior
soundalike cases failed to establish a cause of action for infringement of the right of
publicity by aural imitation. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711 (9th Cir. 1970) (decided under passing-off and unfair competition, no mention
of right of publicity), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (voice not protected under
right of publicity); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (decided
under passing-off and unfair competition, no mention of right of publicity); see also
Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (voice not protected
under New York's privacy/publicity statute).
53. See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13[C], at 11-68.
54. See H.R. Rzp. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 131 (1976) ("The preemption of
rights under State law is complete.., even though the scope of exclusive rights
given the work under [the Act] is narrower than the scope of common-law rights in
the work might have been.").
55. M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 1.01[B], at 1-11 to -12.
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not help to clarify which special characteristics of state created
rights implicate equivalence.
Nimmer has posited that an equivalent right is "one which is in-
fringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution
or display."15 6 Recognizing that such a definition is not easy to ap-
ply, Nimmer goes on to provide a more detailed test.
If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribu-
tion or display... will in itself infringe the state created right, then
such right is preempted. But if other elements required, in addi-
tion to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distri-
bution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of
action, then the right does not lie 'within the general scope of
copyright,' and there is no preemption.
5 7
His "extra element" test has been widely recognized,5 8 enabling
actual application to put flesh on the bones of the test.
In Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd.,s9 the plaintiff
brought, inter alia, common law causes of action for conversion and
misappropriation of her artistic snowflake design. The court
adopted the "extra element" test, but refined it by requiring the ex-
tra element to "be one which changes the nature of the action so
that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim."' 60 To exemplify non-qualitatively different elements, the
court cited "awareness or intent, which alter the action's scope but
not its nature. 6 1 In applying the test to the plaintiff's misappropria-
tion cause of action, the court found the state law equivalent be-
cause it is violated by "precisely the type of misconduct the
56. Id. at S 1.01[B][1], at 1-13.
57. Id. at S 1.01[B][1], at 1-13 to -14 (emphasis in original).
58. See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp.
1236, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F.
Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enter., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
When a right defined by state law [within the subject matter of copyright]
may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of
the exclusive rights, the state law in question must be deemed pre-
empted.... Conversely, when a state law violation is predicated upon an
act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the
rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.
Id. at 200.
59. 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
60. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535; see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 677 n.26 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (a right is equivalent if (1) it is infringed by mere act of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, or (2) it requires additional ele-
ments which "do not differ in kind from those necessary for copyright
infringement.").
61. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535.
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copyright laws are designed to guard against." 2
In Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 63 the plain-
tiffs asserted infringement of singing group The Supremes' right of
publicity by various means, including aural simulation. The court
adopted the reasoning of Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd.
and failed to find the right of publicity claims qualitatively different
since they "derived from defendants [sic] ... use of a copyrighted
work."' This rationale, at least as applied to soundalikes by the
court, has been criticized 6' and is of questionable validity for its fail-
ure to extricate the publicity rights from the copyrighted song, espe-
cially in light of Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 66
Nonetheless, various aspects of a right of publicity action have
been proposed as extra elements withstanding preemption. For ex-
ample, a right of publicity claim requires appropriation of an attri-
bute of the plaintiff for commercial purposes, 67 whereas a copyright
infringement action does not require commercial or economic in-
jury. Thus, an argument has been made that commercial injury is an
extra element.6 s This argument has been rejected, however, on the
basis that the cornmerciality merely alters the scope of the action.
That is, the "basic act which constitutes infringement of plaintiff's
rights... is the same as that of copyright. 69 In both Mayer and
Motown, either mere reproduction or performance of the copy-
righted work triggered infringement of the right of publicity as wen
as copyright.
Notice that but for Mayer's addition of qualitativeness to the "ex-
tra element" test, a determination of equivalency would be inappro-
priate. Without commercial injury, reproduction or performance of
the copyrighted work would not infringe either plaintiffs' rights of
62. Id.
63. 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
64. Id. at 1239-40.
65. See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13[C], at 11-70 ("That the defendant
was infringing plaintiff's copyright does not mean that defendant was not also in-
fringing plaintiff's Right of Publicity.") (emphasis in original).
66. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Midler
does not seek damages for Ford's use of 'Do You Want To Dance,' and thus her
claim is not preempted by federal copyright law. Copyright protects 'original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expresssion.' A voice is not
copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed'.").
67. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
68. See Shipley, supra note 49, at 720; see also Motown Record Corp. v.
George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (pursuant to
requirements of CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1987)); Mayer v. Josiah Wedg-
wood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (commercial immoral-
ity of misappropriation).
69. Shipley, supra note 49, at 720; see Motown, 657 F. Supp. at 1240-41 (The
basic act which constitutes the alledged infringement - the unauthorized use of
plaintiff's composition - is the same as that of copyright and is therefore
preempted.' ").
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publicity. Thus, commerciality should, by strict definition, be an ex-
tra element. Only the Mayer/Motown imposition of a qualitative
character to the element condemns the publicity claims to equiva-
lence. In fact, under the language common to both Mayer and
Motown - the "basic act which constitutes infringement is the same
as that of copyright" - very few publicity claims would survive pre-
emption. Not only would all soundalike claims fail, but so would the
more common claims for appropriation of a visual image. Obvi-
ously, the reproduction of a picture is the same act which constitutes
infringement of copyright and infringement of the right of publicity.
It has also been suggested that the deceptive nature of false en-
dorsement or passing-off, which certainly may exist in soundalike
claims,70 is an extra element.71 Even though this element has been
held to make an unfair competition claim non-equivalent,72 it may
not withstand the Mayer test. It would seem that although the ele-
ment of public deception is distinct in quality from mere reproduc-
tion or performance, under Mayer/lotown the "basic act which
constitutes infringement is the same as that of copyright." More-
over, even if deception were an extra element, it would be of limited
use for publicity plaintiffs since the presence of a disclaimer in an
advertisement would eliminate the deceptive element but leave the
publicity claim unaffected 7 3 and .exposed to preemption.
Another element suggested by publicity proponents is that of sim-
ilarity or identifiability. 74 The publicity action will lie only if the
plaintiff is sufficiently identified by the defendant's use of the copy-
righted work. The one rendition of the work that imitates the plain-
tiff will be affected, leaving the copyright owner with the broader
right to perform the work in myriad non-imitative ways. Although
this rationale seems the least intrusive on rights granted by the Act,
it also fails to change the quality of the action, to say nothing of
Mayer/Motown's "same basic act" test. It is apparent that the
Mayer/lotown rationale, although purporting to focus on the qual-
ity of the rights themselves, produces results discordant with the
spirit of Nimmer's "extra element" test by emphasizing the defend-
70. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (persons hearing the defendant's commercial
thought the plaintiff was singing).
71. See Shipley, supra note 49, at 720-2 1; Note, supra note 18, at 683; Brief for
Appellant at 38, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
6168).
72. See Ippolito v. Ono-Lennon, 139 Misc. 2d 230, 526 N.Y.S.2d 877, 883
(Sup. Ct. 1988).
73. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Halpern, supra note 2, at 1246 & n.268.
74. See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 4.14[E][3], at 4-94; Note, supra note 5, at
457-58; Comment, The Right of Pubiciy as a Means of Protecting Performer's
Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rzv. 141 (1980).
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ant's wrongful conduct and discounting the character of the rights
asserted.
As applied by the courts, the "extra element" test will most likely
result in determinations of equivalent state rights of publicity. How-
ever, the Mayer/Motown formulation is subject to attack for its
smothering effect on most assertions of the right of publicity. There-
fore, as that clearly unrealistic approach may well be replaced by a
more balanced and fair one, it would be wise for the pro-preemption
camp to ready a second argument for use in the wake of Mayer/
Motown's foreseeable demise.
C. Limiting Exclusive Copyrights
Right of publicity defendants raise another argument in favor of
preemption involving the tangled knot of rights that would result if
both copyright and publicity law were simultaneously enforcea-
ble.75 They complain that requiring a copyright licensee to secure
an additional license from the holder of relevant publicity rights in
order to use copyrighted material 76 defeats the policy of copy-
right77 and imposes additional obligations and liabilities upon valid
copyright licensees. 78 The state laws' "overlap" and "limitation"
upon federal rights means that this application of the right of public-
ity is "qualitatively equivalent. ' 79  The author disagrees.
A copyright licensee, or owner for that matter, is not free to ex-
ploit his copyright without regard to the rights of others. For exam-
ple, no one would suggest that the holder of a copyright in a book is
immune to liablility in defamation arising out of the book's content.
Those who advance such an equivalency argument fail to under-
stand that the exclusivity granted by the Act is merely a right to
exclude others from exercising the rights concomitant with a copy-
righted work; it is not an absolute right to use a copyrighted work in
75. Some commentators do not regard this as a true preemption argument since
§ 301 is "designed to determine those conflicts where a state law would seek to
inhibit the use of uncopyrighted material." E.g., Abrams, Copyright, Misappropria-
tion, and Preemption: Consitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection,
1983 Sup. CT. REv. 509, 573 (emphasis supplied).
76. For example, under Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988),
the user of a copyrighted song must now obtain permission from the song's pub-
lisher and, if the user's rendition will simulate the performance on a sound record-
ing, permission from the performer.
77. The broad policy of copyright is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
78. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Brief for Appellees at 34, 45-46, Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168).
79. Id. at 36.
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derogation of the non-copyright rights of others."0 Thus, cases rec-
ognizing multiple bundles of rights in certain copyrighted works
and requiring copyright proprietors to obtain publicity rights in or-
der to exploit such works"1 do not offend federal law, nor do they
require the conclusion that additional rights are equivalent.
D. Fifing the Gap in Section 114
Section 114 of the Act delineates the scope of exclusive rights in
sound recordings.8 2
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing... do not extend to the making or duplication of another
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those
in the copyrighted sound recording.8 3
Because of this language, "[m]ere imitation of a recorded perform-
ance would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one
performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's performance as
exactly as possible."18 4 Plaintiffs evidently have no soundalike
cause of action under the Act. But query: does the foreclosure of a
federal claim leave the states free to provide a cause of action for
exactly the same conduct? Or, does the Act's explicit immunization
of conduct claimed as wrongful by publicity plaintiffs make the
right of publicity a patent example of an equivalent right?8S
Proponents of preemption obviously argue that § 114 exclusively
governs this type of conduct 86 since Sears/Compco held that the
states may not shield that which copyright leaves unsheltered.8 7
Publicity advocates counter with Goldstein, which allowed the
80. See I. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.14[C], at 11-82.
81. See, e.g., Bi-Rite v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 757 F.2d 440, 446 (lst Cir.
1985); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
927 (1982); Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097, 1100
(1908), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1910).
82. Sound recordings are embodied in "phonorecords," which "are material ob-jects in which sounds... are fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Sound recordings
are more commonly known as records, tapes, and compact discs.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
84. H.R. Rzp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1976); see United States v.
Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the 1971 Sound Recording
Amendment to arrive at the same conclusion), cez. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
85. That is, federal law expressly leaves unprotected such conduct. Would not
the fact that the Act addresses this particular subject matter compel the conclusion
that infringement of the right of publicity in this context is equivalent?
86. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 37, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168); see also J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 4.14[E][2], at
4-93 (explicit immunization makes first door "too small to squeeze through").
87. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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states to protect writings outside the scope of federal protection.88
The latter argument, however, proves unavailing.
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 9 the Supreme
Court revisited the exceedingly broad language of Sears/Compco
and harmonized those cases with Goldstein. It stated that "where
Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom
from restraint is required by the national interest,' the States remain
free to promote originality and creativity in their own domains."9 °
Section 114(b) exemplifies the Court's language and how it renders
crystalline the meaning of Sears/Compco. Only when Congress is
silent on a matter of copyright are the states free to act. However,
when Congress has chosen to speak, regardless of whether it pro-
tects or expressly declines to extend protection, such as in § 114(b),
then Congress has determined that federal protection or freedom
from restraint is required by the national interest and the states are
not free to act. This interpretation also accords with Goldstein,
where the court stated that when Congress has "left the area unat-
tended. . . no reason exists why the State should not be free to
act."9 1 By expressly acknowledging the freedom of imitators of
sound recordings from liability under the Act, Congress has not left
the area unattended. Therefore, the states are not free to provide
what is essentially an equivalent right.
I. NATURE OF THE RIGHTS
Assuming arguendo that the first door of § 301 is closed, if it can
be shown that copyright and the right of publcity protect different
subject matter, preemption will not occur.9 2
A. Subject Matter
The subject matter of copyright is original works of authorship
once such works are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
93
Distinction must be made between the work of authorship and its
fixation in tangiblo form.9 4 Only the work of authorship is pro-
tected, not the material object in which fixation subsists.95 In addi-
88. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
89. 109 S.Ct. 971 (1989).
90. Id. at 985 (citations omitted).
91. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973).
92. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
94. See WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc, 693 F.2d
622, 628 (7th Cir. 1982); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 2.03[C], at 2-
32.
95. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra at 2-33 (For example, "a 'literary work'
is a work of authorship, but a 'book' is not. A 'book' is merely a material object
which may embody, and hence constitute, a copy of a given literary work.").
1990]
60 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 1
tion, to qualify as a work of authorship, a work must be the product
of some modicum of creative activity.98 Thus, a work original to its
author that has been produced with some perceivable creative input
is protected by copyright once it is fixed in a material object.
In contrast, the subject matter of the right of publicity is an intan-
gible proprietary interest deriving from the personality of a person
- his persona. 97 This interest cannot be the subject matter of copy-
right because there is no way to reduce it to tangible form.9"
Defendants typically assert, however, that once a person's like-
ness is fixed in tangible form,'his right of publicity interest has been
fixed for copyright purposes and is subject to preemption.99 This
argument has been uniformly rejected.ls ° In the same way that a
picture of a person captures merely one expression of the underly-
ing human being,1 °1 a sound recording of a voice embodies only
that particular expression of identity. The sound in a sound record-
ing is merely an indicium by which a singer can be identified and in
no way encapsulates the total underlying personality in the way that
fixation of a work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression
respresents an entire work for purposes of copyright.1 0 2 As stated in
Midler, a "voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed.'
What is put forward as protectible here is more personal than any
work of authorship." 10 3
There is another reason why the intangible personality interest
protected by the right of publicity cannot be the subject of preemp-
tion. Section 301(a) preempts "works of authorship that are fixed in
96. See id. at § 2.09[F], at 2-138.1.
97. See Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927
(1982); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 849-50, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 346 (1979) (Bird, C.!., dissenting); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra
note 33, § 1.01[B][2], at 1-22.3.
98. See supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 42-43, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168) (citing Shipley, supra note 49, at 708); see also
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (publicity interest is merged into the copyrighted song).
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101. See J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13[C][2], at 11-71.
102. See McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption,
and First Amendment Myths 7Treathening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right,
20 CAL. W.L. Rzv. 415 (1984)
One's persona, in all its varying aspects, is incapable of reduction to tangi-
ble form.... The right of publicity, although analogous to copyright, dif-
fers in that one's persona cannot be placed in a fixed medium. Thus, the
right is not protected under the Copyright Act, and is not preempted by
the Act.
Id. at 423-24.
103. Midler v. Ford. Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
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a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright as specified by section [] 102." °104 The highlighted
portion of the preceding sentence of 1 301 tracks the language of
§ 102 in defining the subject matter of copyright. Therefore, the
second portion of the sentence in § 301 must by implication refer to
the seven categories of works of authorship which comprise the rest
of the definition of the subject matter of copyright in § 102.1' s The
intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of publicity
cannot be said to fall into any of the enumerated categories and is
therefore, not the subject matter of copyright, unless some new cate-
gory can be conceived of for "personas."
B. Baltimore Orioles
The foregoing would allow the right of publicity to escape pre-
emption through the second door of § 301 were it not for the exist-
ence of Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Player's
Ass'In,1 0 6 in which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit man-
aged to mangle the right of publicity and preemption analysis.
In Baltimore Orioles, major league baseball players attempted to
oust the right to broadcast baseball games from the club owners by
wedging their intrinsic right of publicity between the performances
of the games themselves and the telecasts of the games in which the
owners clearly held copyrights. In other words, the players analo-
gized the telecasts to pictures of individual people which, although
copyrighted, are not commercially exploitable without the subject's
consent. 10 7 The court held that the players' right of publicity was
fixed in tangible form once recorded on videotape and hence sub-
ject to preemption by the federally copyrighted game telecasts.10 8
If Baltimore Orioles is good law, then the right of publicity will be
subordinated whenever an identifiable expression of persona be-
104. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Id.
106. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
107. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; CAL. Crv. CODs § 3344(a) (West
Supp. 1990); N.Y. Cry. RioHrs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990).
108. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674-78.
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comes fixed in tangible form' °9 and the analysis set forth in Part
ILIA, supra, would be eviscerated. Fortunately, the case has
spawned a fury of criticism for its erroneous analysis of copyright
and right of publicity law." 0
The court's first mistake concerns copyright law. By contending
that a baseball game itself is copyrightable, 111 the court failed to
distinguish between the noncopyrightable performance and the
copyrightable videotape made therefrom.112 The court's statement
that "once a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is no
distinction between the performance and the recording of the per-
formance for the purpose of preemption"'1 13 may be true when the
underlying performance consists of copyrightable subject matter,114
however, a spontaneous event per se is not copyrightable. 1 5 Thus,
a baseball game does not qualify as a work of authorship,1 6 for it
lacks the requisite "modest amount of intellectual labor"1 17 r,4-
quired for copyrightability." 8 Rather, the videotape memorializa-
109. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 33, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168).
110. Seee.g., M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 1.01[B][2], at 1-22.3 to -
22.4, § 2.09[F], at 2-138.1 to -138.5; Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the
Old Ballgame: Preemption of Performer's Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright
Act of 1976, 20 Amz. ST. L.J. 369 (1988); Casenote, Balitmore Orioles, Inc. v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Association: The Right of Publicity in Game Perform-
ances and Federal Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L. Rzv. 861 (1989)
[hereinafter Casenote, Game Performances]; Casenote, The Seventh Circuit Beans
Performer Publicity Rights in Baseball's Telecast Rights Rhubarb, 8 Loy. ENr. L.J. 75
(1988) [hereinafter Casenote, Seventh Circuit]; Casenote, Right of Publicity and
Copyright Preemption After Baltimore Orioles, 40 RuTomm L. Rzv. 971 (1988)
[hereinafter Casenote, After Baltimore Orioles].
111. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7 ("The work that is the subject of
copyright is not merely the Players' performances, but rather the telecast of the
Players' performances.") (emphasis in orginial).
112. See Casenote, Game Performances, supra note 110, at 862.
113. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675.
114. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 2.10[A], at 2-144.1 to -146;
see also Casenote, After Baltimore Orioles, supra note 110 at 982.
115. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithorgraphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)(holding that graphic depictions of circus acts were copyrightable but the actual
acts themselves were not, the court stated that "[o]thers are free to copy the original
L] [t]hey are not free to copy the copy"); Casenote, Seventh Circuit, supra note 110,
at 86-87 (reality is not copyrightable); see also Casenote, Game Performances,
supra note 110, at 870 ("Additionally, the games are not supported by an underly-
ing 'writing.' The runs batted in, the strikeouts, and the home runs are not scripted
prior to the actual performances.").
116. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d 367, 377 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33,
§ 2.09[F], at 2-138.2.
117. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668 n.6.
118. See id. at 669 n.7, 676 (court doubts and then discounts the existence of any
creativity in the players' performance, relying instead on the creative input of the
technical crew).
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tion of the game is copyrightable because of the creative input of
the technical crew responsible for the recordation."1 9 The Seventh
Circuit incorrectly viewed the game and the videotape as inter-
changeable for copyright purposes. 1
20
The court's second mistake occurred in its right of publicity analy-
sis. It rejected four opinions that found the right of publicity not
preempted by copyright121 and held that fixation of a performance
essentially fixes the persona. 122 Although this rationale has been
approved by a few commentators based on a separate right of pub-
licity inhering in performance values, 123 the better view is that pub-
licity rights inhere in the persona. 124 A performance, like a picture,
videotape, or sound recording, is just the indicium by which the per-
son is identified.
Oddly enough, the Seventh Circuit came out with the right result;
it simply relied on the wrong rationale. The court should have re-
lied on the work for hire doctrine, applicable under the Act, and
applied it analogously to the players' right of publicity. 12s The court
discussed this issue, refused to find it conclusive, '2 6 and instead,
119. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33, § 2.09[FJ, at 2-138.1; Casenote,
Seventh Circuit, supra note 110, at 88.
120. See supra note 111, 113 and accompanying text; see also M. Nimmer & D.
Nimmer, supra note 33, § 1.01[B][2], at 1-22.4 n.89.9 ("the court holds that baseball
games qualify as works of authorship for preemption purposes because the motion
pictures in which they are fixed are copyrightable works"); Casenote, Game Per-
formances, supra note 28, at 888 ("The performance must not be merged into a
copyrightable work, merely because it has been filmed."); Casenote, Seventh Cir-
cult, supra note 110, at 88 ("What is fixed in tangible form is not the game itself,
but the game's depicition as created by the television crew.").
The court's mistake is manifest in the absurdities resulting from the application of
its rationale to other situations. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, supra note 33,
§ 2.09[F], at 2-138.3 to -138.4 (fan taking snapshot of game would violate copy-
right); Casenote, Game Performances, supra note 110, at 886 (person could not
restrict the unauthorized use of his photo for advertisements); Casenote, Seventh
Circuit, supra note 110, at 87-88 (circus acts could not be depicted by others after
the first depiction is copyrighted).
121. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679 n.26 (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927
(1982); Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Apigram Publishing Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. C78-525, slip. op. (N.D. Ohio,
July 30, 1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)).
122. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 678 n.26 ("Because a performance is
fixed in tangible form when it is recorded, a right of publicity in a performance that
has been reduced to tangible form is subject to preemption.").
123. See, e.g., J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 11.13(C)(2), at 11-72 n.67.1;
Shipley, supra note 49, at 718.
124. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
125. The district court decided the case based on the employer-employee rela-
tionship. See Balitmore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 1985
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 25,822 (N.D. IMl. 1985).
126. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679-82.
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found it necessary to decide the case on the preemption issues.
CONCLUSION
With Baltimore Orioles thoroughly discredited, the second door
of the preemption test remains open. Although a performer's asser-
tion of publicity rights as embodied in a distinctive rendition of a
musical work is probably equivalent to rights assertable under copy-
right law, by asserting such rights the performer is seeking to protect
something outside the scope of the Act. Ultimately, the question of
whether society should protect the rights of performers to their own
personal and imitable performances may be answered by state leg-
islatures, Congress, or the Supreme Court.
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